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I. INTRODUCTION
Websites are not only an important part of our electronic lives, they
1
are an important financial and business asset in their own right. With
the growth of the internet as a commercial, informational, and
recreational resource, companies utilize websites as an important part of
their corporate financial portfolio and structure. The increased value of
websites that comes from this growth has made websites a valuable asset
2
that companies seek to use as they would other business assets. One
important consideration is how the value of websites will be treated
upon sale or exchange. In other words, is the website an asset that can
3
be merely capitalized and act as a recovery of basis, or can it be
4
amortized and written off before being sold to a different buyer?
The tax code and regulations provide several potential methods to
answer this question. This Comment will explore the interactions
between some of those tax code provisions, specifically 26 U.S.C. § 197,
and to a lesser degree, I.R.S. Revenue Procedure 2000-50, and the
intellectual property rights associated with websites. Part II of this
Comment presents a hypothetical, which will demonstrate how a
website’s intellectual property rights interact with some of the current
tax laws. Part III will briefly explore how the intellectual property

1. For example, witness the power of www.Amazon.com; without the website,
Amazon’s entire business strategy would be virtually impossible.
2. Such as equipment used for a trade or business. See 26 U.S.C. § 167(a)(1) (2006).
3. Like unimproved land, see 26 U.S.C. § 174(c) (2006), or cash.
4. For example, the owner of an apartment building or equipment used in a trade or
business can depreciate the basis over the statutory life.
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rights of copyright, patent, and trademark apply to websites, with
particular emphasis on the issues that copyrights have with websites.
Part IV will explore the history of intangible asset amortization, which
culminated in the creation of 26 U.S.C. § 197 in 1993. Part IV will
discuss the way websites’ intellectual property rights interact with
section 197 and Revenue Procedure 2000-50. Part V of this Comment
will discuss conclusions and some potential solutions for the problems
presented by the tax code and regulations.
5

II. GOGOL AND MICROEVIL : THE CORPORATE TAKEOVER FROM THE
SILICON VALLEY
Let us pretend that there exists a company called Microevil, Inc.
This company, flush with cash from a release of an operating system
upgrade that no one needed, but that the company “encouraged” its
customers to use, looks out upon the tech landscape and finds a plucky
Silicon Valley company, called Gogol, that created a web browser,
which has become all the rage on the internet. Microevil decides that it
wants to acquire Gogol and all of the software, patents, copyrights,
trademarks, and other assets that Gogol has.
At the time of Microevil’s purchase attempt, Gogol has the following
6
rights that are germane to the problem at issue in this comment : First,
Gogol has the web browser itself, on which it holds some registered
copyrights. Second, Gogol holds a patent that covers at least some of
the software that runs its browser. Third, Gogol has registered
copyrights that protect some of the software. Fourth, Gogol holds a
7
trademark on its corporate name and the name of its browser. All of
these assets are sought by Microevil in its acquisition of Gogol.
Microevil succeeds in its quest and Gogol is now nothing more than
the trademarked name of a web browser and search engine, which is a
wholly owned piece of the Microevil Empire. At the end of the year,
Microevil’s CEO and board calls you, their intrepid attorney, into the
boardroom to explain to them the tax ramifications of the acquisition of
8
Gogol’s intellectual property rights. You understand the intellectual
5. These names are made up. Any similarity to actual parties is completely
coincidental.
6. For the purposes of this hypothetical, it will be assumed that either no one has
challenged any of the intellectual property rights listed, or that the rights have been held
valid.
7. Most corporate setups will be far more complicated, but for the purposes of this
comment, a simple hypothetical works best.
8. Any corporate merger or acquisition will have far more tax consequences than what
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property implications of the transferred rights that Microevil acquired
earlier that year, but you need a moment to think of the tax
ramifications of the Gogol acquisition. You know that the bottom line
increased with increased ad sales, but you wonder now if some sort of
9
loss exists that you can deduct from these profits. Then you remember
from the mists of a tax class or CLE you attended about how intellectual
property rights are sometimes called intangible assets. Success!
Microevil may have some deductions for this year’s corporate tax
return. First, let us see how all of these intellectual property rights and
tax provisions work. Then, we will see how they work for Microevil and
your report to the CEO and Board.
III. WEBSITES AS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
All of the major categories of intellectual property may offer
10
protection to websites. Although this fact is true, this Comment will
focus more closely on copyrights because copyrights pose some of the
11
most interesting issues for the tax law discussed in this Comment.
However, at least a brief discussion of the patent and trademark issues
surrounding websites is necessary to provide a full picture of the
intellectual property landscape that websites occupy. Accordingly, after
a more lengthy discussion of the copyrights a website may qualify for, a
brief discussion of a website’s potential patents and trademarks will
follow.
A. Copyright
Since December 1980, computer programs can be protected by
12
copyrights. Websites are a form of computer software that courts and
is discussed in this comment, but this comment concerns only one narrow issue of corporate
tax policy involving intellectual property rights.
9. While I use the term “loss” here, no actual loss, as in a decrease in the value of the
asset, may have occurred. In tax terms, deductions like section 197 are sometimes referred to
as “paper losses.” This type of loss is different from something like an actual loss because of
fire or disaster, which can be a real and permanent loss. With a “paper loss” the property still
is in the hands of the owner. Upon sale, the taxpayer would have to pay taxes on any value
he, she, or it depreciated.
10. Since websites are a form of computer software, they can be protected, potentially,
by any intellectual property right that a piece of computer software can (e.g. copyright and
patent). Infra Part III.
11. Specifically for section 197 and its accompanying regulations.
12. Patent and Trademark Laws, amendment, PUB. L. NO. 96–517, § 10, 94 Stat. 3015,
3028 (1980) (Congress tacked the changes concerning copyrights of computer software to the
Copyright Act onto the end of this law). See also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006); Apple Computer
Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1248 (3d Cir. 1983) (finding that the 1980 Act
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regulators analyze in those terms. When it comes right down to the
nitty-gritty, websites are simply another form of computer software.
Although a website may have specialized uses (e.g. Amazon.com for the
sale of goods, Google as a search engine, or CNN.com for news and
current events information), at their core, websites are simply another
form of computer program. Therefore, websites must be analyzed as a
type of computer software, and computer software is a suitable format
13
for protection through copyrights.
Where this maxim becomes more difficult is how the classification of
the software as copyrightable affects its tax status under section 197,
14
which the Comment discusses later. On the other hand, this section of
the Comment concerns only how the nature of a website affects how
copyright law applies to it. In that vein, two separate copyright
questions arise in the context of a website: (1) whether the software that
runs, operates, and allows the website to function can be copyrighted;
and (2) whether the actual material posted on the website can be
15
protected by copyrights. This section will address these two issues in
turn, and will then address how the two forms of protection may,
sometimes, interact.
1. Copyright Requirements in General
All copyrights, including computer programs and software, must
comply with the limitations Congress placed on the right. Therefore,
websites must be a work of authorship that is both original and fixed in
16
some tangible medium. If the website, in either its programming and
software or its content, is not a work of original authorship, the website
will not be copyrighted at all. Finally, the work a party seeks to protect
must be within the sphere of copyright protection. In other words, the
work must fit into one of the eight delineated categories in section 102,
17
or the work will not be eligible for copyright protection. Thus, I will
made computer programs protectable under the Copyright Act).
13. See, e.g., JustMed, Inc. v. Byce, 600 F.3d 1118, 1123–25 (9th Cir. 2010) (analyzing
how computer software receives copyright protection).
14. Infra Part IV.
15. The first question concerns materials that actually run the website or computer
program. For example, such a program as the operating system of a computer would be
covered by this question. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714
F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983). The second question concerns the actual material on the website.
This material includes such items as writing, pictures, or the whole arrangement and
compilation of the material, to name a few examples.
16. H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, § 102 (1976).
17. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
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begin this section with a brief recitation of the two core copyright
concepts and the subject matter copyright protects. Then, I will analyze
how the elements affect websites.
a. Originality
18

For a work of authorship to be copyrighted, it must be original. In
the words of Justice O’Connor, “[t]he sine qua non of copyright is
19
originality.” The Supreme Court, in detail, explained that originality
was important because it went to the very essence of the power the
20
Constitution granted Congress.
Thus, for any material to be
copyrighted, it must be an original work.
The question facing the Court in Feist v. Rural Telephone Co.,
however, was what originality exactly meant within the 1976 Copyright
Act (“the 1976 Act”). The Court noted that the 1976 Act did not
21
change the definition of original works. No new doctrines needed to
be formulated to deal with this issue. Instead, the Court looked to its
own jurisprudence in the subject and made the following observations
and decisions that shaped the meaning of originality for copyrights:
22
unlike patents, where the work in question must be novel, copyright,
where the work must be original, imposes a far lower standard for the
23
24
applicant or work to meet. The work need only be slightly original.
Indeed, if two separate authors create the same exact work
independently of the other, the works are still original and eligible for
25
copyright protection. Thus, originality is not a high bar for a work to
meet.
Despite the low bar that a work must meet to be original under the
1976 Act, not all works meet this level of creativity. The greatest debate
18. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 347. “The originality requirement is constitutionally mandated for all works.”
(quoting Patterson & Joyce, Monopolizing the Law: The Scope of Copyright Protection for
Law Reports and Statutory Compilations, 36 UCLA L. Rev. 719, 763, n. 155 (1989)). Id.
21. Id. at 355 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, p. 51 (1976)). The Court cited the House
Report on the 1976 Act, which explicitly stated that the definition of originality was
unchanged, and the definition courts used prior to the 1976 Act would continue to be used.
Id.
22. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966).
23. Fiest, 499 U.S. at 345.
24. Indeed, the Court noted that most works could meet this criteria because most
works have “some creative spark ‘no matter how crude, humble[,] or obvious’ it might be.”
Id. (quoting M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 1.08(C)(1) (1990)).
25. Id. at 345–46 (citing Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d
Cir. 1936)).
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26

over this fact comes in the realm of compilations. Several different
27
types of compilations exist. The most difficult type of compilation to
quantify, for purposes of originality, is the factual compilation because
28
facts themselves cannot be copyrighted. “[F]acts do not owe their
origin to an act of authorship. . . . The first person to find and report a
particular fact has not created the fact; he or she has merely discovered
29
its existence.” A compilation of facts may be creative enough to satisfy
30
the originality requirement. The originality does not stem from the
facts themselves, but rather from the author’s actions regarding the
31
facts. The author must make decisions on the use of the facts: (1)
whether to include certain facts; (2) where to place the facts in relation
to each other; or (3) in the format in which the facts will be presented to
32
the public.
Consequently, while originality is a very low bar for a work to pass,
it is still a limit on what may be copyrighted because allowing a person
to copyright a general fact would remove that fact from the public
33
domain.
That prospect is the antithesis of Congress’s grant of
authority in the realm of copyrights: “not to reward the labors of
34
authors, but ‘to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’”
b. Fixation in a Tangible Medium
The second requirement of copyright is that the work be fixed in
35
some tangible medium. The definition for this term creates a two-part
26. See id. at 347–48.
27. For example an anthology of short stories could be a literary compilation. An
academic journal could also qualify as a compilation in the same way. Factual compilations
are more difficult to quantify because these works seem relatively uncreative, but the Court
has found that these works can indeed be copyrighted if the arrangement is original enough.
Feist, 499 U.S. at 348. These forms of compilation, however, require somewhat stricter
scrutiny and the copyright is relatively weak because of the low level of creativity. See id. at
348–49.
28. Id. at 347.
29. Id. The Court then states that the Census takers would be a good example of this
maxim. Id. The census taker discovers the population, he or she does not create it. Id.
30. Id. at 348.
31. Id. In other types of compilations, and other copyright issues, this concept is
referred to as the idea/expression, or fact/expression, dichotomy. Id. at 350.
32. Id. This list is by no means exhaustive of the potential choices an author may
make, but it is merely meant to be illustrative.
33. Id. (quoting Miller v. Universal Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1369 (5th Cir. 1981)).
34. Id. at 349 (quoting U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
35. The term “fixed in a tangible medium” is defined in 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) as
follows:
A work is “fixed” in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a
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test that must be satisfied for a work to be fixed in a tangible medium:
(1) the work must be in a medium where it can be perceived; and (2) it
36
must be fixed for a more than a transitory period of time. The tangible
medium can be one of any number of mediums. Photographs, video
recordings, compact discs, and books are only a few examples of
37
mediums that may qualify.
The time requirement has become more complicated with the
advent of computer technology, but it essentially holds that the work
must exist in the tangible medium for longer than a transitory period of
38
39
time. This test is fact specific because of the nature of the medium.
Thus, the duration of the period of the copy depends upon the work, the
medium it is transmitted through or on, and the actual length of the
occurrence.
c. Subject-Matter Under 17 U.S.C. § 102
Although it is somewhat axiomatic to say, if a work is not one of the
defined works under section 102 of the 1976 Act, it cannot be
40
copyrighted. The 1976 Act protects eight categories of expression.
Generally, if your work is not covered by one of these categories, you
cannot receive a copyright from the government, and you have no
protection from some other party copying your work. Computer
software, as will be explored, does not have this problem, however,
because it can be classified under two potential types of subject matter
41
under section 102: literary works and compilations.

copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently
permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration. A work consisting of
sounds, images, or both, that are being transmitted, is “fixed” for purposes of this
title if a fixation of the work is being made simultaneously with its transmission.
36. Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir.
2008) (citing NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 8.02[B][3], at 8-32 (2007)); Adv. Computer Servs. of
Michigan, Inc. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 363 (E.D. Va. 1994).
37. The qualifying mediums are closely related to the subject matter that the 1976 Act
protects under section 106. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). Within the definitions of the
exclusive rights a copyright holder possesses, the act describes some potential tangible
mediums. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 106(5) (2006) (“including the individual images of a motion
picture or other audiovisual work”).
38. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). See also Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 127–30.
39. See Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 130.
40. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
41. Infra Part III.A.2.
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2. Copyright Law Applied to Websites and Computer Software
As previously stated, computer software can be protected under the
42
Copyright Act. This protection, however, was not inevitable. When
Congress enacted the 1976 Act, it chose not to include computer
43
This decision came
programs as a class of copyrightable material.
about in large part because, two years before the passage of the 1976
Act, Congress created a commission to study the effects of computers
44
and technology on intellectual property.
Subsequent to the
commission’s report, Congress passed the 1980 amendment that, for the
first time, defined what a computer program was within the meaning of
45
the 1976 Act.
With Congress’s passage of this amendment, the
floodgates of litigation opened, and many computer software
developers, businesses, programmers, and other people and entities
clamored for the protection of copyrights.
The first question the courts had to answer was what parts of
computer programs could actually be protected via copyright. Like
46
other forms of expression, not all parts of computer software or
programs are eligible for copyright protection. Beyond that issue,
however, lay the dichotomy of the computer age concerning copyright:
what, precisely, in the realm of computer software can receive copyright
protection, and what parts are the mere facts? In other words, what is
the idea and what is the expression in computer software. After that
question we must ask what “fixed in a tangible medium” means for
computer software. Once those questions are answered, the scope of
copyright protections for computer software coalesces.
Like other works, computer programs may qualify for multiple types
of copyrights. In particular, computer software and programs qualify as
two types of subject matter under sections 102 and 103: (1) literary

42. JustMed, Inc. v. Byce, 600 F.3d 1118, 1125, n.3 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Johnson
Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys., Inc., 886 F.2d 1173, 1175 (9th Cir. 1989)).
43. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1247 (3d Cir.
1983).
44. Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 93–573, § 201, 88 Stat. 1873 (1974)).
45. Patent and Trademark Laws, amendment, Pub. L. No. 96–517, § 10, 94 Stat. 3015,
3028 (1980).
46. Feist, 499 U.S. at 348. “The mere fact that a work is copyrighted does not mean
that every element of the work may be protected. Originality remains the sine qua non of
copyright; accordingly, copyright protection may extend only to those components of a work
that are original to the author.” Id. (citing Patterson & Joyce, Monopolizing the Law: The
Scope of Copyright Protection for Law Reports and Statutory Compilations, 36 UCLA L.
REV. 719, 800–02 (1989)).
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48

works, and (2) a form of compilation. However, these two forms of
subject matter may protect different parts of the computer program.
The two types of works at issue with computer software or
programs, including websites, are the literal works and the non-literal
works. Courts refer to the part of the computer program called either
the source code or object code as the literal element of the software or
49
program; thus, this part of the computer software is protected as a
50
literary work. The non-literal works, on the other hand, are more akin
to compilations, and these parts of the software or program may also
51
receive copyright protection.
No doubt exists that computer programs and software are a form of
literary work. Congress itself acknowledged that computer programs
are a form of literary work under the 1976 Act, and the courts accept
52
that determination. Accordingly, no real debate exists over whether
53
the actual computer code itself can be copyrighted.
On the other hand, the non-literal components of the computer
software or program also may qualify for copyright protection. This
component is essentially a compilations issue because it usually
concerns the way in which certain commands, information, or facts are
54
either used or presented by the author. Consequently, the rationale
used by the Court in Feist applies rather well to this area of copyrights
55
for non-literal computer components.
In sum, computer software qualifies for two types of copyrights,
literary and compilation. The copyrights apply to different parts of the
software, but both types must meet the core tests of copyright, that is,
the work must be original and fixed in a tangible medium. If a website’s
computer software meets these tests, the website owner possesses valid

47. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2006).
48. 17 U.S.C. § 103 (2006).
49. Fonar Corp. v. Domenick, 105 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Computer
Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 702 (2d Cir. 1992)).
50. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 702 (2d Cir. 1992).
51. Gen. Universal Sys., Inc. v. Lee, 379 F.3d 131, 142 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam).
52. Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1234 (3d Cir. 1986)
(citing H.R. REP. NO. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54).
53. Courts use several different terms for the computer code. The two most common,
and accepted, are the source and object code. Fonar Corp. v. Domenick, 105 F.3d 99, 104 (2d
Cir. 1997) (quoting Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 702). See also
Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 876–77 (3d Cir. 1982).
54. Compaq Computer Corp. v. Procom Tech., Inc., 908 F. Supp. 1409, 1418 (S.D. Tex.
1995).
55. See, e.g., Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 711–12.

BOWEN- FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

WEBSITES AND INTANGIBLE ASSET

11/15/2011 11:05 AM

191

copyrights for the computer software. Finally, the actual material
physically on the website itself may qualify for copyright protection as a
56
compilation. Accordingly, websites are the source of at least three
57
different types of copyrights, which could prove valuable to a
corporate owner.
B. Patents and Websites
When talking about patents and websites, the exact thing that a
person acquires a patent for is the computer software; thus, the question
that must be asked is whether a website’s computer software qualifies
for patent protection. Computer software can qualify for a patent, but
58
this determination was not an inevitable result.
In fact, the exact
59
parameters are still up for debate and modification even today. In
Bilski v. Kappos, the Supreme Court declined to give any greater clarity
to the situation, but the Court did hold that the machine-ortransformation test was not the sole method of determining if a process
60
patent was valid, but “just an important and useful clue.” Whatever
61
the parameters and length of this debate, the important fact for the
purposes of this Comment is that computer software can qualify for
62
patent protection. Of course, any patent, including a patent for a piece
of software, must meet the statutory requirements “that the invention
be novel, see section 102, nonobvious, see section 103, and fully and
63
particularly described, see section 112.”
For the purposes of this
Comment, it will be assumed that any patent discussed in the Microevil

56. For example, a way of presenting an electoral map on CNN, or the arrangement of
information on the website could qualify for a copyright exclusive of the computer software
that runs the site.
57. If a party sold their copyright to some actual literary work to some corporate body,
who then placed the copyrighted material on the website, that copyright would be valid as
well. However, that copyright is not really a part of the structure of the website.
58. See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–73 (1972) (first case on
patentability of computer software).
59. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
60. Id. at 3226.
61. And this debate will continue for some time if the amount of ink that courts and
scholars have spilled over this issue is any indication.
62. See 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 1.03[6] (2011) (explaining the
history of process patents, in particular with reference to computer software). See also
Robotic Vision Sys., Inc. v. View Engineering, Inc., 249 F.3d 1307, 1311–13 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(analyzing a case involving the on-sale bar, which involved a patent that included computer
software).
63. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225. All internal statutory citations refer to Title 35 of the
United States Code.
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hypothetical meets all of the statutory requirements and is a valid
computer software patent.
C. Trademarks and Websites
In terms of trademarks and websites, two potential trademarkable
items leap to mind: (1) the website owners own corporate trademark,
64
and (2) the website’s domain name. That a corporate trademark can
65
receive protection is no great surprise. Thus, like patents above, I will
not bore the reader with the intricacies of basic trademark law in
relation to a corporate trademark. Suffice it to say, a corporate name
can qualify for trademark protection if it meets the normal tests of
whether the mark in question points distinctly to the company that
66
67
68
created the product, is not functional, and is used in commerce.
Trademarks can encompass a wide variety of subject matter including
69
words, names, and symbols.
Consequently, it is likely that the
corporate name of a company would potentially qualify for trademark
protection, and for the purposes of this Comment, it will be assumed
that the corporate name and logo have qualified for trademark
protection.
The more complicated question is whether the domain name itself
can qualify for trademark protection. At least some parties believe that
70
a domain name can qualify for trademark protection.
It must be
acknowledged that some court cases have called into question whether a
domain name can be trademarked, but it still may be possible if the
64. By the corporate trademark, I refer to the corporate name. One example of this
would be Amazon.com. The name Amazon may be trademarked as a corporate logo, and
could qualify for § 197 amortization. Whether or not the domain name of Amazon.com itself
can receive trademark protection is still something of an open question. See infra section
III(C) of this Comment.
65. Otherwise, trademark protection would be worthless. All a person needs to do is
ask a company like McDonald’s, Louis Vuitton, or Wal-Mart what their brand name is worth
to them, and it can clearly be demonstrated that these are valuable trademarks.
66. When a person thinks of the Golden Arches, it points to McDonald’s the
company, not the arches themselves or the hamburgers. See also 1-1 JEROME GILSON,
GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 1.03[1] (2011).
67. “It is the province of patent law, not trademark law, to encourage invention by
granting inventors a monopoly over new product designs or functions.” 74 AM. JUR. 2d
Trademarks and Tradenames, § 32 (2001) (citing Genesee Brewing Co., Inc. v. Stroh Brewing
Co., 124 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 1997)).
68. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(3)(C) (2006).
69. See, e.g., Samson Cordage Works v. Puritan Cordage Mills, 211 F. 603 (6th Cir.
1914).
70. Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, Taxing the New Intellectual Property
Right, 56 HAST. L.J. 1 (2004–2005).
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domain name passes the normal tests for a trademark. In spite of this
hesitance on the part of the courts, I have found no case where a court
72
explicitly stated that a domain name cannot be trademarked. Thus, for
the sake of argument, this Comment will assume that Gogol.com was
able to qualify for a trademark. Even if the domain name did not
qualify, the name Gogol itself qualifies for trademark protection as a
corporate logo, so it is likely that under the Anti-Cybersquatting
73
Consumer Protection Act the mark would be protected from infringing
domain names that include the corporate logo. Consequently, the
domain name would receive some tangential protection because of the
trademark on the corporate name.
Now that the potential intellectual property rights a website may
qualify for are clear, the next area of law that must be discussed is the
tax law in question, specifically, the tax law related to the amortization
of intangible assets in trade or business sales and exchanges.
IV. THE EVOLUTION OF TAX LAW FOR INTANGIBLE ASSETS
The law regarding the amortization of intangible assets has a lengthy
74
history. Since almost the beginning of the United States tax code, at
least some intangible assets have been eligible for some form of
75
amortization. Of concern to this Comment is the application of the
amortization of intangible assets to intellectual property rights. Before
briefly discussing the history of amortization as applied to intellectual
property rights, I will first explain the basic mechanics of amortization.
Then I will briefly detail the evolution of amortization as applied to
intellectual property. Finally, I will explain the current section 197, and
how it applies to intellectual property in general, and websites in
71. See, e.g., In re 1800Mattress.com IP, LLC, 586 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (finding a
specific domain name did not meet the test for a trademark, but the case never held that
domain name categorically could not qualify for trademark protection).
72. Although I will state that I also have not found a case where the court did allow a
domain name to be trademarked either. At best this area of law seems to be somewhat in a
standoff mode with no court categorically denying the right, but also no court actually letting
such a trademark exist. Thus, this area of the law is in a state of flux.
73. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2006). The Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act
was enacted by Congress in 1999 to protect trademarks from cyber piracy. Pub. L. No. 106–
113, 113 Stat. 1536, 1501A-545–48 (1999). See also 1-4 PAUL D. MCGRADY, JR., MCGRADY
ON DOMAIN NAMES, § 4.02.
74. See, e.g., Catherine L. Hammond, Note, The Amortization of Intangible Assets: S
197 of the Internal Revenue Code Settles the Confusion, 27 CONN. L. REV. 915 (Spring 1995)
(explaining the history behind the amortization of intangible assets, which includes
intellectual property rights).
75. Id. at 916–17.
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particular.
A. Amortization in a Nutshell
76

Amortization is a process that operates much like depreciation.
The principle of amortization can best be communicated via an
example. Company A purchases Company B for $50,000,000. While
evaluating its new purchase, Company A values a patent it acquired
from its purchase at $12,000,000. How does the company amortize the
value of the patent it gained from this business transaction?
77
Under the current section 197, that patent can be amortized over
78
fifteen years using a straight-line method of amortization.
Thus,
Company A may deduct $800,000 per year over the next fifteen years.
This calculation, of course, assumes that the purchase occurred in the
first month of the year. Under section 197, if the purchase occurs in
some other month, the first year’s deduction equals one year’s worth of
amortization times the number of months out of twelve. For example, if
Company A purchased Company B in July, Company A would qualify
79
for six months of amortization in the first year, or $400,000. For the
next 14 years Company A could take its $800,000 deduction, and then in
year sixteen, the company would take the remaining $400,000
amortization deduction left over from the first year. Company A would
now have no basis remaining, and the patent would now be “worthless”
80
from a tax cost recovery standpoint.
In fact, the patent may be
worthless from a non-tax standpoint by this time as well, or for some

76. In fact, the operation of both amortization and depreciation are so similar that
courts have often conflated the two, but “Black’s Law Dictionary tells us that intangible
assets are amortized, while tangible assets are depreciated.” Newark Morning Ledger Co. v.
United States, 507 U.S. 546, 571 n.1 (1993) (Souter, J. dissenting). In reality, the two
processes are virtually the same except for name.
77. 26 U.S.C. § 197(a) (2006).
78.
26 U.S.C. §§ 197(a), (d)(1)(C)(iii) (2006).
The straight-line method of
amortization or depreciation simply means that the entity deducts the same amount every
taxable year rather than at some other statutory accelerated method, such as accelerated cost
recovery under 26 U.S.C. § 168(b)(1)-(2) (2006).
79. Under section 197, Company A would use the first of July as the date calculation
of amortization. See 26 U.S.C. § 197(a) (2006); 26 C.F.R. § 1.197–2(f)(1). Since Company A
would have possession of the patent for six months (July through December) of the first year,
the company could depreciate half the values of one-year's amortization, or $400,000.
80. In tax, the amortization deductions are taken from the adjusted basis (AB) of an
asset. In this hypo, the AB of the patent was twelve million dollars before amortization
began. Once the amortization finished, the AB of the patent is zero. Consequently, if the
patent were to be sold, Company A would pay tax on the full sales price because no basis
exists any longer for Company A to recover.
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time before the deductions ran out. At its simplest, this method is how
82
the amortization of intangible assets operates.
B. A Brief History of the Amortization of Intangible Assets
As stated earlier, intangible asset amortization is almost as old as the
Internal Revenue Code, but its history is lengthy and tortured. Several
other authors have analyzed the history of amortization as applied to
83
intangible assets; therefore, I will only briefly cover this history for
sake of completeness.
1. The Beginning of Intangible Asset Amortization and Section 167
The amortization of intangible assets first entered the American tax
84
structure in 1919. As with the later section 167, the amortization was
85
limited to items that possessed a finite lifespan in trade or business.
After briefly flirting with the idea of allowing the amortization of
86
goodwill for a business that died, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
ended that flirtation when it decided that goodwill could not be
87
exhausted in a trade or business. This decision set the stage for the
constant battles the IRS and taxpayers had in moving assets out of the
goodwill column and into the intangible asset column.
When Congress passed the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, section

81. If the patent expired by the end of the amortization, the patent likely has little
value to Company A because it now faces competition from potential competitors. If the
patent has only one year or two left before expiration, it will literally be decreasing in value
every day the patent gets closer to its expiration.
82. Please note that other issues could affect how, when, and where this deduction
may be applied. For example, in a partnership context, amortization would be affected by
the special allocation rules found in 26 U.S.C. § 704(c). This Comment, however, will discuss
the mechanics of amortization in only its most basic form, and it will not delve into the more
complex mechanics of amortization and depreciation.
83. See, e.g., Catherine L. Hammond, Note, The Amortization of Intangible Assets: S
197 of the Internal Revenue Code Settles the Confusion, 27 CONN. L. REV. 915 (Spring 1995)
(providing a general history of intangible asset amortization); Andrew F. Halaby, Comment,
Treatment of Goodwill by the Seller Under I.R.C. Section 197, 43 U. KAN L. REV. 903 (July
1995) (explaining history of intangible asset amortization in relation to goodwill). For a
history written in conjunction with an intellectual property topic see Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen
& Jeffrey A. Maine, Taxing the New Intellectual Property Right, 56 HAST. L.J. 1, 12–22 (2004–
2005).
84. Hammond, supra note 74, at 916 & n.8.
85. Id. at 916.
86. Id. at 916–17. The Department of Treasury’s “generosity” was brought on by
liquor distributors suffering the effects of prohibition. Id. at 916 (citing Newark Morning
Ledger Co. v. United States, 507 U.S. 546, 574–75 n.2 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting)).
87. Red Wing Malting Co. v. Willicuts, 15 F.2d 626, 633 (8th Cir. 1926).
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167 became the section of the Code dedicated to the depreciation and
88
amortization of business assets. While the statute spoke in generalities
about what property is eligible for amortization, it specifically excluded
89
trademarks and trade names from amortization, but section 167
90
allowed the amortization of both patents and copyrights. From an
intellectual property standpoint, this situation was most unfair to
businesses that held high value trademarks, trade names, and trade
91
secrets.
In a broader context, companies and the IRS fought for
92
decades over the classification of assets, but two events would
eventually end most of the squabbles the IRS and Corporate America
had over goodwill and other intangible assets of indeterminate length.
2. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States and the 1993 Revenue
Reconciliation Act
All of the confusion and fuss came to a head in 1993. Two events,
one judicial and one legislative, occurred that enacted a sea of change in
the process of intangible asset amortization. First, the United States
Supreme Court handed down its decision in Newark Morning Ledger
93
Co. v. United States.
Second, Congress passed the 1993 Omnibus
94
Revenue Reconciliation Act (the “Revenue Act”), which created § 197
of the Internal Revenue Code. These two actions changed the
landscape of intangible asset amortization.
a. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States
The events that created this case began in 1976, when the Herald

88. Hammond, supra note 74, at 918.
89. 26 U.S.C. § 167(r) (1988).
90. 26 U.S.C. § 167 (1988).
91. To illustrate the problem, imagine if a company like Maytag were bought by
another company. The Maytag trade name has great value because of its history and the
Maytag Corporation’s investment in its name. Under section 167, pre-1993, see, e.g., 26
U.S.C. § 167(r) (1988), the purchasing corporation would not have been able to amortize the
cost of Maytag acquiring the trademark and name. The best that the purchasing company
may have been able to do is capitalize the costs into the basis and take advantage of the
recovery of basis when it sold the Maytag “name.” Given the potential value of these names,
most companies would not sell these assets piecemeal (if ever). Therefore, the basis recovery
would likely occur only when the company was acquired in whole through a merger or sale,
or potentially as part of a bankruptcy.
92. See, e.g., Houston Chronicle Publ’g Co. v. United States, 481 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir.
1973); Richard S. Miller & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 537 F.2d 446 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
93. 507 U.S. 546 (1993).
94. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312
(1993).
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Company bought a company called Booth Newspapers, Inc.
The
96
Herald Company continued to publish Booth’s newspapers. Herald
estimated the fair market values of all of the assets it got in its merger
97
with Booth. For three years, 1977–1980, Herald deducted an amount
calculated in a straight-line method, which the IRS then disallowed
because the subscriber list was too much like the business concept of
98
goodwill. Thus, the Newark Morning Ledger lawsuit began.
Eventually, the Newark Morning Ledger Co. (Newark) completed a
merger/takeover of the Herald Company, and it became the plaintiff in
99
this suit. At the District Court level, Newark proved, through statistics
100
and expert witnesses, that the paid subscriber list had a finite lifespan;
therefore, the company argued that it qualified for amortization under
section 167. The IRS offered no counter evidence, except for contesting
101
some of the valuation figures. Instead, the IRS argued that the paid
subscriber database was an analogue to business goodwill; thus, the
102
asset could not be amortized under the Code of that time.
The
District Court found for Newark, holding that the paid subscriber base
103
had a finite lifespan, and the IRS then appealed to the Third Circuit.
The Third Circuit ruled in the IRS’s favor, and Newark then appealed
104
105
to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari. The Court held that
Newark could amortize the paid subscriber list because Newark “bor[e]
successfully its substantial burden of proving that ‘paid subscribers’
constitutes an intangible asset with an ascertainable value and a limited
useful life, the duration of which can be ascertained with reasonable
106
accuracy.” Thus, Newark could amortize this intangible asset.
95. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 507 U.S. 546, 549 (1993).
96. Id. The eight papers Herald bought were published in Michigan. Id.
97. Id. at 549–50. Herald bought the company for approximately $328,000,000. Id. at
549. It gave a value to certain assets (e.g. cash, securities, equipment, etc.), but it also valued
paid subscribers at $67,800,000. Id. at 550.
98. Id. at 550. As previously explained, goodwill could not be amortized under § 167
because no good way existed to calculate its length. See supra Part IV.B.1.
99. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 507 U.S. at 549. The merger completed in 1987.
100. Id. at 551.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 552–53.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 553 (citing Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 503 U.S. 970, 970
(1992) (granting Newark’s cert petition)).
105. Id. at 548. Justice Blackmun wrote the majority decision for a 5-4 Court.
106. Id. at 570. The Court also emphasized that any expectation of continued
customer patronage was irrelevant because Newark proved that the paid subscribers asset
fulfilled all of the necessary conditions of § 167. Id.
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Four justices dissented. Justice Souter wrote that “[s]ince the days
of Justice Story, we have understood the concept of ‘goodwill’ to be
anchored in the patronage a business receives from ‘constant or
107
habitual’ customers.”
The dissenters saw nothing different between
Newark’s subscriber lists and the traditional idea of goodwill, which
108
The dissenters would have held that the
could not be amortized.
subscribers lists were indistinguishable from goodwill, and therefore,
109
non-amortizable as a matter of law. At its core, the dissenting justices
believed that the Court should not upset a longstanding doctrine of law
110
without some sort of Congressional action. That Congressional action
was soon to come.
b. 1993 Revenue Act
Congress had contemplated action on the intangible asset front for
111
some time, and it had considered several different proposals.
Eventually, Congress passed the Revenue Act and included within it
Congress’s new policy. In a nutshell, the 1993 Revenue Act ended the
112
idea that an intangible asset needed a finite lifespan. Specifically, the
Revenue Act created 26 U.S.C. § 197, which supplemented and
113
This
supplanted some of the purview of section 167 of the Code.
section greatly impacted intellectual property rights because trademarks
114
and trade secrets could be amortized, instead of capitalized.
Consequently, for the first time, all the major bodies of intellectual
property law became eligible for amortization.
3. Section 197 in Brief
Section 197 is now the main vehicle for amortization of intangible
115
assets. This section became a part of the Internal Revenue Code as a
107. Id. at 572 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Metropolitan Bank v. St. Louis Dispatch
Co., 149 U.S. 436, 446 (1893)).
108. Id. at 573 (Souter, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 581–82 (Souter, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 582 (footnote omitted).
111. Hammond, supra note, 74 at 932–33.
112. The 1993 Revenue Act changed many other things as well (including helping
Republicans win the House and Senate in 1994), but for the purpose of this comment, all that
is of concern in the Revenue Act is the creation of section 197.
113. 107 Stat. 312, 532–41 (1993).
114. Compare 26 U.S.C. § 197(d)(1)(F) (2006) (adding trademarks and trade names to
the list of intangible assets potentially eligible for amortization) with 26 U.S.C. § 167(r) (1988)
(specifically excluding trademarks and trade names from amortization).
115. Even with the creation of section 197, section 167 contains some vestigial
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result of numerous litigation battles. Congress acted to correct many
of the unanswered questions and problems that section 167 and the
myriad of court cases over its intangible asset provisions spawned. In a
macro sense, for the first time goodwill was unquestionably
117
amortizable, and, in the micro sense, all the major forms of intellectual
property patents, copyrights, and trademarks, were eligible for
118
amortization. Some of the mechanics have already been described in
119
the Amortization in a Nutshell section of this comment, but I will
briefly elaborate on the actual operation of what section 197 does here.
Section 197 applies only in a business transaction context where a
120
sale or exchange of good happened. Self-created intellectual property
121
rights are ineligible under this section of the Code.
In addition, all
intellectual property rights now potentially qualify for amortization
122
Another large change from the days of
under section 197.
amortization under section 167 is that the “life” of the asset no longer
123
matters for amortization.
Instead, section 197 imposes a uniform
124
fifteen-year amortization period on section 197 intangible assets. The
mechanics of the operation of amortization were already explained in
the Amortization in a Nutshell section of this Comment; therefore, I will
125
not rehash the actual operations here. In brief, this passage describes
the general structure and operation of section 197, but this section of the
Internal Revenue Code becomes more complex when a website is
thrown into the mix, as will soon become clear.

intangible asset amortization provisions in relation to intellectual property rights, specifically,
patents and copyrights. 26 U.S.C. § 167(f) (2006); 26 C.F.R. § 197–2(a)(2). However, these
rights will not apply at all if section 197 can be used by the business entity for that intangible.
JEFFREY A. MAINE & XUAN-THAO N. NGUYEN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TAXATION:
TRANSACTION AND LITIGATION ISSUES 242 (BNA Books 2003).
116. The ultimate case being Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 507 U.S.
546 (2003).
117. 26 U.S.C. § 197(d)(1)(A) (2006).
118. 26 U.S.C. §§ 197(d)(1)(C)(iii), 197(d)(1)(F) (2006).
119. Supra Part IV.A.
120. 26 U.S.C. § 197(c)(1)(B) (2006).
121. 26 U.S.C. § 197(c)(2) (2006).
122. 26 U.S.C. §§ 197(d)(1)(C)(iii), 197(d)(1)(F) (2006).
123. Under section 167, amortization occurred over the lifetime of the asset. For
example, if the purchased patent had thirteen years left until expiration that is the time
period the company could amortize the costs over thirteen years, the lifetime remaining in the
patent. This timing issue changed with the adoption of section 197.
124. 26 U.S.C. § 197(a) (2006).
125. Supra Part IV.A.
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V. THE TAXATION OF WEBSITES: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
COMPUTER SOFTWARE
At this point in time, several different Code provisions and
regulations govern the tax benefits surrounding websites. While section
197 and its regulations alone are important, they cannot be looked at in
isolation. Other equally important portions of the tax code affect the
126
tax treatment of these assets.
This section of the comment explains
how section 197 specifically affects websites and computer software.
Then, I will briefly explain how IRS Revenue Procedure 2000-50
interacts with computer software. Then I will elaborate on the problems
with the current tax regime.
After providing that background
information, I will apply that information to the Microevil hypothetical
to give greater clarity to the situation by providing a tangible example
for the reader. Finally, at the end of this section, there is a short
discussion on some of the implications the current tax regime has for
websites and other similar pieces of intellectual property. Along with
these implications, some potential solutions will be proposed.
A. Section 197, Its Regulations, and Revenue Procedure 2000-50: Their
Application to Websites
Pertinent to websites, computer software, as defined section § 197,
127
has several severe restrictions for amortization.
These restrictions,
discussed in greater detail below, have severe ramifications for a
corporation or partnership that purchases a website and its associated
rights. Those ramifications will now be discussed in greater detail.
1. Section 197 and Its Regulations
To fully understand the interactions of the various Code provisions
and Regulations, the pertinent parts of the Code and Regulations must
be singled out. The first important provisions are the Code sections that
explain the method of amortization used for section 197 intangibles,
128
which have already been discussed earlier in this Comment; thus,
these sections need not be covered again. The second section of the
126. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 2000-50, 2000–52 I.R.B. 601 § 5 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 174(a))
(explaining how the Internal Revenue Code handles software development costs like R & D
expenditures).
127. 26 U.S.C. § 197(e)(3) (2006). The Treasury regulations elaborate upon this point
in greater detail (as is true with most tax provisions). See, e.g., 26 C.F.R. § 1.197–2(c)(4) (no
amortization for computer software available to the general public), § 1.197–2(c)(4)(iv)
(definition of computer software from section 197 elaborated upon by the IRS).
128. Supra Part IV.A.
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Code is the part which defines the intellectual property rights of patents,
129
copyrights, and trademarks as section 197 intangibles. At first glance,
section 197 would appear to protect all the potential intellectual
130
property rights for which a website can qualify.
However, this
conclusion fails to take into account one of the key exceptions Congress
included in section 197 itself, and that the Department of the Treasury,
through the IRS, enacted to govern these taxable transactions.
This third provision is the restrictions on the amortization of
131
computer software that cause massive problems for all business
holders of intellectual property rights associated with computer
132
The problem becomes especially acute when websites are
software.
involved in the process because of the many potential intellectual
property rights that a website represents.
Section 197 defines
“computer software” as “any program designed to cause a computer to
perform a desired function. Such term shall not include any data base
or similar item unless the database or item is in the public domain and is
incidental to the operation of otherwise qualifying computer
133
software.”
a. Patents
On its own, this definition has some bad implications for intellectual
property rights. For example, the phrase “any program designed to
performed a desired function,” potentially precludes a process patent,
which for computer software would likely be a program or algorithm
designed to perform desired functions. This definition potentially
prevents a computer software process patent from amortization under
section 197.
b. Copyrights
Not only patents have difficulty clearing this hurdle. Both types of
computer software copyrights face problems with section 197. Like the

129. 26 U.S.C. §§ 197(d)(1)(C)(iii), 197(d)(1)(F) (2006).
130. Id.
131. 26 U.S.C. § 197(e)(3); 26 C.F.R. § 1.197–2(c)(4).
132. Beyond the problems that this Comment covers, section 197(e)(3)(A) also
precludes from amortization “computer software which is readily available for purchase by
the general public, is subject to a nonexclusive license, and has not been substantially
modified” and that was not acquired in a trade or business transaction. While this exclusion
is important, it is beyond the scope of this Comment’s subject matter; therefore, it will not be
mentioned in any greater detail throughout this Comment. 26 U.S.C. § 197(e)(3) (2006).
133. 26 U.S.C. § 197(e)(3)(B) (2006).
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process patent, literal computer software copyrights potentially could be
foreclosed from amortization under section 197, when computer
software is defined the way section 197 defines it. As discussed above,
computer software qualifies for copyright protection of the source code
134
135
as a literary work. Source code, as one court described it, “is code
written in a programming language . . . . Object code is produced by
rendering those same programming instructions in a binary form that
136
the computer can read.”
Even more disturbing is the definition the
Copyright Act itself gives to a computer program: “A ‘computer
program’ is a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or
137
indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result.”
138
When compared to the section 197 definition of a computer program,
the definitions are virtually identical; consequently, the literal copyright
cannot be amortized under section 197.
Compilation copyrights for computer software are also somewhat
endangered by these exceptions. Although the Code itself does not
specifically imperil these copyrights, the IRS regulations do. Under the
139
regulations, the database compilation copyright is directly attacked.
The regulations state the following:
[c]omputer software does not include any data or information
base . . . of this section unless the data base or item is in the
public domain and is incidental to a computer program. For this
purpose, a copyrighted or propriety data or information base is
treated as in the public domain if its availability through the
computer program does not contribute significantly to the cost of
140
the program.
This explanation has the potential to absorb a great many
compilation copyrights related to computer software. Unfortunately, no
134. Supra Part III.A.
135. JustMed, 600 F.3d at 1121 n.1 (9th Cir. 2010). See also Softel, Inc. v. Dragon
Medical & Scientific Communications, Inc., 118 F.3d 955, 958–59 (2d Cir. 1997) (defining
source code and explaining how it performs functions on computers); 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
136. JustMed, 600 F.3d at 1121, n.1.
137. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
138. Compare 26 U.S.C. § 197(e)(3)(B) (2006) (definition of computer software under
section 197) with 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (definition of computer program under the Copyright
Act).
139. 26 C.F..R. § 1.197–2(c)(4)(iv).
140. Id. The regulations give the example of the dictionary of a spell check program
as a data or information base that would be in the public domain for the purposes of this
definition.
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case or administrative hearing has yet come forward that will help
provide some context for this provision of the tax regulations. In the
terms of websites and computer software in general, however, this
regulation could be devastating. Other than an author or artist posting
original works on a website, no other work on the website really
qualifies for any other copyright protection. Thus, it is indeed possible
for a computer software compilation copyright to qualify as a section
197 intangible and actually survive the computer software exception, but
the holder must be very careful about what the copyright covers.
c. Trademarks
141

In contrast, trademarks get off relatively lightly but not completely
unscathed. For the regulations, the core question about trademark and
computer software is if the trademark is either acquired for marketing
purposes (e.g. the brand name MICROSOFT), or if “[the] trademark or
trade name is ancillary to the ownership or use of a specific computer
142
Thus, the
software program in the taxpayer’s trade or business.”
corporate logo may survive and so might a domain name if it was used
143
for marketing purposes. In all, section 197 and its regulations seem far
less punishing to trademarks than patents and copyrights.
2. Revenue Procedure 2000-50 and Other Tax provisions
Beyond the Code and Regulations, the IRS issued Revenue
Procedure 2000-50 in 2000 as a way to streamline and organize how the
144
tax code treats the different provisions related to computer software.
This document was the first real comprehensive guidance the IRS gave
145
on the tax treatment of computer software since 1969.
It defines
146
computer software almost identically to section 197; therefore, it is
little surprise that the Revenue Procedure provides scant help to the
holders of intellectual property rights held in conjunction with websites.
In fact, section 197 is mentioned sparingly, but tellingly when the
141. But perhaps not to great surprise given that trademarks generally do not protect
the computer software itself.
142. 26 C.F.R. § 1.197–2(c)(4)(iv).
143. For instance, some may remember the Ask Jeeves commercials of the late 1990s,
the name Amazon.com, or GoDaddy.com in NASCAR. All of these marks are used for
marketing purposes and would likely qualify for amortization because they avoid one of the
prongs that would trip this regulation.
144. Rev. Proc. 2000–50, 2000–52 I.R.B 601, 2000–1 C.B. 601.
145. See id.
146. Compare Rev. Proc. 2000–50, 2000–1 C.B. 601, § 2 with 26 U.S.C. § 197(e)(3)(B)
(2006).
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Procedure states “[t]his revenue procedure does not apply to any
computer software that is subject to amortization as an ‘amortizable
147
While this
section 197 intangible’ as defined in section 197(c).”
language appears generous, the definitions in section 197 and the
regulations obliterate much of the generosity. Almost all “computer
software” is not amortizable under section 197; therefore, this revenue
148
procedure may be the only way to actually handle computer software.
Whether or not business will challenge these provisions is still unclear,
149
but the potential for litigation is there. Finally, it must be noted that
other tax provisions can affect the treatment of intellectual property.
To list all of them would turn this paper from a Comment to a treatise,
150
and that work has already been done by others.
Thus, referencing
their treatise for a more in-depth discussion of the full breadth of
intellectual property taxation is highly recommended.
B. Section 197 Applied to the Acquired Gogol Intellectual Property
Rights in the Microevil Hypothetical
Returning to the Microevil hypothetical, I will address each of the
four potential deductions under section 197 in the following order: (1)
the web browser itself and its registered copyrights; (2) the patent that
covers at least some of the software that runs the browser; (3) the
registered copyrights that protect some of the software; and (4) the
trademark of Gogol as the name of its browser.
1. The Web Browser
A web browser is a website, and thus, can qualify for some level of
copyright protection. I must note that in this section, I will not be
discussing the copyrights attached to the website’s software, or other

147. Rev. Proc. 2000–50, 2000–1 C.B. 601, § 4 “Scope.”
148. An interesting question this raises is whether the intellectual property rights can
be treated the same as computer software. This question could be important because some of
the tax provisions for computer software are quite generous. See, e.g., id. at §§ 5 & 6 (under
section 5 the costs of developing the computer software are treated similarly to R & D costs
under 26 U.S.C. § 174, whether or not a copyright or patent applies). As one commentator
suggested the IRS may have recognized some of the problems and tried to pre-empt them.
Nguyen & Maine, supra note 70, at 75 n. 241.
149. Revenue Procedure 2000–50 is important to the realm of computer software
taxation, but it is somewhat tangential to the main topic of this Comment, the effect of
section 197 of the Internal Revenue Code on Websites. This small introduction to the
Revenue Procedure has been provided because it helps give context to the types of
regulations that may be in play, from a tax perspective, with a piece of intellectual property.
150. See, e.g., MAINE & NGUYEN supra note 115.
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151

copyrights, but rather the copyright protection the website can acquire
as a compilation. Copyright protection as a compilation is a trait that
many different websites may have or be able to get; therefore, I will
focus on that copyright for the actual material on the website.
For a compilation to qualify for a copyright, the primary hurdle, as
152
153
previously discussed, is whether the compilation is original.
Some
minimal degree of creativity is required for a compilation of facts to
merit copyright protection; thus, an electronic arrangement of facts
154
fixed in a tangible medium would seem to qualify.
For the sake of
argument, and for the purposes of this Comment, I will assume that
Gogol’s website has enough originality to qualify it for copyright
protection, and because it bears little relation to computer software that
runs the website, it is very likely that this compilation copyright will
qualify for amortization under section 197. This form of copyright
simply is not related enough to the statutory definition of computer
software in section 197 to be swallowed by the computer software
exception. Thus, the material on the Gogol website likely qualifies for
amortization.
2. Patents for Website Software
Software itself can qualify for a patent. The software that runs
Gogol’s website would be the patentable subject matter, and it could
155
qualify for a process patent.
However, as is now clear from the
156
discussion of the tax law, it is likely impossible for a process patent on
computer software to ever qualify for amortization under section 197.
The definition of software and the regulations promulgated by the IRS
combine to make this fact true. Therefore, Gogol’s process patent on its
157
software cannot be amortized under section 197.
151. Other copyrights can be used in conjunction with a website. For example, an
author could post his or her copyrighted work to a website or sell it as an e-book. See, e.g.,
Amazon.com, available at http://www.amazon.com. (commercial website that sells
copyrighted e-books). For the sake of simplicity, I will not be addressing that issue in this
Comment. Suffice it to say that the addition of this copyright could make what is already a
complicated tax problem even more complicated.
152. Supra Part III.A.
153. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991).
154. See, e.g., Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 127-30
(2d Cir. 2008); Adv. Computer Servs. of Michigan, Inc. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp 356,
362–64 (E.D. Va. 1994).
155. Supra Part III.B.
156. Supra Part IV.
157. It should be noted that even though section 197 might not allow cost recovery for
the patent, or indeed for the copyrights, the vestigial rights contained in section 167(f) may

BOWEN- FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

206

MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.

11/15/2011 11:05 AM

[Vol. 16:1

3. Copyrights of the Software
158

As discussed above, since the early 1980s courts have recognized
that computer software can be protected by the Copyright Act.
However, as was made clear from a comparison of the Copyright Act
with section 197, the literary copyright will be absorbed by the definition
of computer software found in section 197 and it attendant regulations.
Therefore, the literary copyright, like the computer software process
patent, will not qualify for amortization under section 197.
The compilation copyright is more problematic. In a classic legal
response, whether or not this copyright qualifies for amortization under
section 197 depends on how closely the compilation entwines with the
computer software. If the answer is too close, this copyright also faces
absorption into the computer software exception, if it is less entwined
the copyright is an amortizable section 197 intangible asset.
4. Trademark of the Gogol Domain Name and Name Gogol as a
Corporate Name
159

As Professors Maine and Nguyen have studied exhaustively,
domain names of websites could and should qualify for trademark
protection. This protection is limited, of course, by the domain name
fulfilling the legal requirements for trademark protection, but here, we
will assume that the domain name does indeed qualify for trademark
160
protection.
And even if the domain name itself fails to qualify for
trademark protection, if the trademarked corporate logo is a part of the
website’s domain name, it will be protected as a part of the core logo’s
161
trademark protection. Accordingly, the Gogol corporate logo, name,
162
and domain name can be amortized as section 197 intangibles.
In total, the trademarks and compilation copyrights are the only
intellectual property rights that will qualify for amortization under
section 197. This outcome is not what the Microevil Board of Directors
potentially allow some cost recovery. Despite the creation of section 197, section 167 still has
a part to play in the amortization of some intellectual property. However, that analysis and
discussion is somewhat outside the focus of this Comment, but the possibility did have to be
mentioned.
158. Supra Part III.A.
159. Nguyen & Maine, supra note 70.
160. As stated earlier, the current state of domain names and trademarks is in tension,
but for the purposes of this Comment it will be assumed that the domain name qualifies for
trademark protection.
161. 1-4 PAUL D. MCGRADY, JR., MCGRADY ON DOMAIN NAMES, § 4.02.
162. Although outside the realm of this Comment, it should be noted that the IRS
could still object to the value Microevil would potentially place on each of these assets.
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expects from their intrepid attorneys, but this answer is the only one
163
that you can give.
C. Potential Solutions to the Problem
As is fairly obvious by now, section 197, intellectual property, and
computer software have a dysfunctional marriage. Some of this tension
may be explained by the simple fact that so much of computer software
and intellectual property are intertwined. The Silicon Valley would not
exist without the protection the government offers to inventors,
thinkers, dreamers, and makers. However, in section 197, Congress
apparently has conflated computer software together with the
intellectual property rights held on the software. This conflation gravely
decreases the potential tax benefits available to a corporation in
164
mergers, takeovers, purchases, and other similar business transactions.
Particularly, in a realm where successful businesses dominate the
165
166
airwaves but also had some of the biggest busts possible, a tax
regime that encourages the orderly takeover of more troubled
companies would be beneficial. Unfortunately, the current tax code
stands in the way by obliterating much of the advantages a sale of a
website could bring, tax wise, to the purchasing company. What follows
are some possible solutions to break the log jam.
1. Regulatory Action
Although the regulations are certainly not written in a manner that
is helpful to intellectual property rights, the IRS may not have much
choice. In the end, the regulatory agencies must work with what
Congress gives them, and section 197 itself is inhospitable to the
confluence of intellectual property and computer software. Therefore,
the IRS may have done all it can do with the issuance of Revenue
Procedure 2000-50. While that revenue procedure is not perfect, it at
163. It must be noted that the Internal Revenue Code does not hate all computer
software or intellectual property. Indeed, Revenue Procedure 2000-50, shows the ways in
which computer software qualifies for tax benefits. Also, patents in particular are very
favored under the tax code. For example, under section 174 R & D costs can be amortized in
the year they are incurred successful or not. This Comment is merely meant to show one of
the ways in which intellectual property rights are not helped by provisions of the tax code. It
is not meant to illustrate that the Internal Revenue Code hates intellectual property.
164. Indeed, the prospective of paper tax losses is good reason for a healthier
company to take over a more troubled company. The prospect of those losses, which may
help protect other profits, could be a key reason for a purchase.
165. E.g. www.Google.com
166. E.g. the dot com bubble burst on Wall Street.
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least brings some order to a relatively chaotic area of the law. On the
other hand, in its regulations, the IRS went a little further than it
probably had to when it came to absorbing computer software’s
168
ancillary rights into the exception; however, given what Congress gave
the IRS to work with, this course of action may have been all the IRS
had open at the time. Consequently, any real movement in this area will
probably have to come from Congress itself.
2. Congress
Congress did a good thing when it created section 197. After many
years of litigation in the courts, Congress brought some order to the
chaotic field of intangible asset amortization. Congress finally gave
equality to all intellectual property rights, but then it laid a
knuckleduster on the Silicon Valley by potentially eviscerating the
ability of tech companies to actually use their intellectual property rights
for beneficial tax treatment. Congress could ameliorate this problem in
several ways.
First, Congress could make it possible for companies to elect which
tax treatment they want when they first purchase the intellectual
property right. Some may say that this will add another record for
people to keep as part of their business but it is already done in other
169
areas of the tax code. In fact, when Congress passed section 197, the
IRS passed regulations allowing for holders of intangible assets to use
170
section 197 if they bought the asset up to two years before passage.
Accordingly, no real record keeping problem exists, and the companies
would have the opportunity to make an informed choice about how to
handle their tech assets.
Second, Congress could rewrite section 197 over from the beginning.
While this option has the advantage of being dramatic, it is not very
likely because the code section works quite well in most cases. The real
problem is with the interaction between computer software and
intellectual property rights; therefore, two other options present
themselves for consideration. First, the entire computer software and
167. See, e.g., Nguyen & Maine, supra note 70, at 75 n. 421 (noting that the IRS acted
to bring some order to the area of the law by not having parties run three to four different
calculations for software tax purposes).
168. 26 C.F.R. § 1.197–2(c)(4)(iv).
169. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 2513 (2006) (gift splitting among married couples, must be
elected at the time of the gift tax return, cannot change). In fact, the entire unified credit for
estate and gift tax purposes is premised on the idea that people keep these records for life.
170. 26 C.F.R. § 1.197–1T.
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intellectual property issue could be taken out of section 197 and placed
into its own Code section. Given the incredible importance that
computer technology has to the American economy, this area of the
economy deserves its own consideration in the Internal Revenue Code.
Thus, having a section detailing and explicitly saying how these rights
interact with each other would greatly clarify the situation. It would
also give more certainty to the business and computer technology world,
and would greatly benefit the economy.
Third, Congress could potentially rewrite only the portions of
section 197 that contain the computer software exception. This option
has several of the benefits of making computer software its own section.
At the same time, it may be more doable for Congress because it is
171
likely easier to tweak a Code section than create a new one.
Fourth, perhaps the hardest and easiest option of all, Congress could
do nothing. Section 197 is already effective in most respects, and
Congress will not want to upset that progress. Additionally, perhaps
there is no good way to do what needs to be done at this time. It took
decades to create section 197, its regulations, and Revenue Procedure
2000-50. Perhaps Congress requires more evidence before it wades
once more into the rapids. Therefore, perhaps this is the best that
Congress can do and not rocking the boat at this time may be the safest
and easiest path at this time.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the last thirty years, America has become more and more
computerized and information driven. As a consequence the business
community has used technology to increase their profits and growth.
One of the most important tools to come out of this growth is the
explosion of the internet, and at the core of the internet is the many
websites that comprise it. Websites have become a core part of many
172
businesses’ financial portfolios. Everyone from the local corner store
to Amazon.com has come to rely on websites for their financial growth,
and it is fitting that the tax code encourages the growth of these
important engines of the American economy. However, Congress
needlessly handicapped the tech community with its section 197
computer software exceptions. To balance the playing field once more,
Congress should amend or rewrite section 197 to take into account the
171.
years.
172.

Look at the time it took to create section 197 from section 167; more than forty
See Nguyen & Maine, supra note 70, at 5.
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valuable plane that technological intellectual property rights have in our
economy.
If it does so, Congress will encourage the business
community to invest in websites and e-commerce in greater and greater
numbers, which will be a boon for the American economy, and finally
level the playing field for all intangible assets under the Internal
Revenue Code.
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